cross-posted from: https://lemmy.ca/post/53819509
There are certain words you don’t want to hear in a medical checkup or in an investment bank’s recession outlook: “stable but elevated.” It’s a phrase that could refer to blood pressure, even risk of a heart attack, a favorite metaphor of hedge fund legend Ray Dalio, or in UBS’s evaluation, risk of a recession.
The bank found that from May through July, the “hard data” from the U.S. economy has shown an elevated risk level, standing at a probability of 93% most recently. This sits at “historically worrying levels,” UBS says, given this signal’s track record of identifying turning points using data from the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The bank notes other classic warning signs of an impending recession from the data, such as the inverted yield curve, which it notes is 23% inverted, steady in recent months but up sharply since the start of 2025. Based on building stress in credit markets, it finds the credit metrics-based recession probability has risen to 41%, roughly doubling since January.
Fortune’s reporting throughout 2025 has outlined mounting warning signs the U.S. is headed toward a recession, echoing and expanding on the UBS research note’s findings. But when UBS zooms in to the hard data, it finds that while most metrics are turning negative, it’s more in a “mile wide, inch deep” kind of “malaise.” None of the hard series of data is showing “signs of rapid unraveling,” according to the team led by Pierre Lafourcade, resulting in an overall bill of health: “Soggy, soft, weak, yes, but not collapsing.” Key findings
The UBS analysis of “hard data” reflects the bank’s own proprietary factor model, which relies on objective, non-survey-based economic indicators such as personal income, consumption, industrial production, and employment data. It filters out sentiment surveys, purchasing manager indexes (PMIs), and financial market signals.
After a brief recovery at the end of 2024, the hard data signal tipped decisively back into negative territory starting in February 2025. The sideways movement since May suggests sustained weakness rather than any new acceleration downward. According to the note, none of the major hard economic series were showing the kind of sharp, downside deviation (such as more than one standard deviation below trend) typically seen directly ahead of past recessions.
The key message is that the U.S. economy, by these hard data measures, is locked in a prolonged phase of stagnation or slow contraction, warranting caution even as outright collapse has not yet materialized. This aligns with other analysts’ warnings that even if a recession doesn’t materialize, the economy is headed for a bout of 1970s-style “stagflation,” a combination of a stagnating economy and rising inflation. For similar reasons, UBS is actually not forecasting a recession despite this 93% probability in the hard data. Aggregate recession risk
Despite the elevated risk, UBS’s economics team is not formally forecasting a recession, but rather expects “soggy growth” followed by improvement in 2026. The bank notes its U.S. Economics team has recently warned about “stall speed” in the economy, especially after the July jobs report revealed very low employment growth, and that call now seems “roughly consistent with the roughly 50-50 interpretation combining the credit data, yield curve, and leading hard data indicators.”
UBS averaged the hard data together with inverted yield curve and credit markets to produce an aggregate recession probability of 52% for July, up 15 percentage points since January and at levels historically associated with NBER-designated recessions. The bank’s recession tracker, therefore, points to a precarious balance for the U.S. economy—much weaker than a soft landing, but not yet collapsing—leaving policymakers and market watchers on alert as 2025 progresses. The other recession calls
Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics, warned in early August the U.S. was on the precipice of a recession, citing much of the same hard data as UBS. Zandi argued the major revisions downward in the July report recalled earlier inflection points before recessions, when he sees revisions as much likelier due to swings in economic activity.
Zandi’s remarks followed a similar warning from JPMorgan, which said it has “consistently emphasized that a slide in labor demand of this magnitude is a recession warning signal…In episodes when labor demand slides with a growth downshift, it is often a precursor to retrenchment.”
In the weeks since, Zandi has voiced concerns over the coming winter of 2025/2026 as the time of greatest vulnerability, putting the odds of a recession at 50-50. Within a few days, Zandi argued states accounting for almost one-third of GDP were either in recession already or at risk of it. By his calculations, only one-third of the economy was expanding as of late August.
The only problem with this theory is that crypto is fundamentally pegged to the dollar through stablecoins. 15 years ago, there was an argument that bitcoins functioned as an escape valve - like gold or treasuries - and you could flee to it as a shelter from declining asset prices, because they had a firmer floor than revenue generating businesses.
Stablecoins changed the math, because so much crypto buying/selling is predicated on stablecoins operating as a vehicle for liquidity. Now crypto relies on this continued cycle of increased cash flow just like any actual productive enterprise. The valuation of these coins is predicated on more people buying them up (up to and including pension funds and US Treasury assets). When we’ve seen short-term contractions and adjustments in the market, the crypto markets fell just as fast as everything else. In fact, the sharp dip in market futures over the last two weeks wiped out a bunch of over-leveraged crypto holders for exactly this reason.
Crypto isn’t an escape from the dollar. It is effectively a form of legal counterfeiting. You can print a “US Coin” that you claim is worth one dollar and trade it for one real dollar. And because interest rates are so low, people can borrow real dollars to by fake stablecoin dollars, effectively laundering privately generated currency into publicly printed money.
If we do see a crash, it’s not the dollar that’s going to tumble. The crypto coins are what are primed to implode, for the same reason S&Ls crashed in the 80s and we had all those bank runs in the 30s. The stablecoin markets don’t have anything remotely like the cash reserves to back their outstanding credit.
You are spot on about Stablecoins, there are $180B worth of USDT alone outstanding and nobody believes they have the reserves stored as dollars anywhere. Accounts that large are hard to hide. Yet, they have not failed to meet redemptions yet, so clearly they are doing something right.
But, what I am talking about is a purposeful devaluation of the dollar vs. other currencies. It is so easy to trade in and out of the crypto markets in different currencies now that if the Dollar would take a sudden plunge vs. other world currencies, that plunge would have to be reflected in the crypto market as well, simply because of arbitrage.
Our President has made no secret of the fact that he wants stuff made here, and would intentionally weaken the dollar to get there. He cares about the dollar even less, when his current fortune doesn’t depend on the dollar at all.
Because there’s always someone on the receiving end willing to handle the trade at a vig.
What brought down the US banks in 2008 and then Europe in 2010 was a panic over the daily interbank lending rate. Nobody was holding cash on hand. They all just debted and credited one another in the moment and then settled accounts at the end of the day or the week.
Once firms were spooked, they stopped lending so freely. That created an enormous bottle neck in the lending flow. And it’s at this point where not having a real cash reserve caused businesses to fail.
The Fed can always relieve this crisis by flooding the market with more dollars. But crypto - by design - has no central broker to relax liquidity in a credit crunch.
That’s his goal. But in breaking the links to international markets, he’s caused a shortfall in USD overseas. This creates a problem for anyone with USD denominated debts.
Over the long term it devalues the dollar by decoupling us from our biggest trading partners. But over the short term it drives up demand for international dollar reserves to settle existing dollar debts.
In any case, neither strategy bringing manufacturing home, because none of it incentives domestic construction of manufacturing capital.