If elected prime minister, Takaichi will face a host of issues, including an ageing population and growing unease about immigration.

Sanae Takaichi has been elected as the head of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and is therefore likely to become the next prime minister and the first woman to lead the country.

Takaichi beat Shinjiro Koizumi, the son of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, in a run-off vote on Saturday after none of the five candidates won a majority in the first round of voting.

A vote in parliament to choose the next prime minister is expected to be held on October 15. A former economic security minister, Takaichi, 64, skews towards the right-wing flank of the LDP.

Her election only involved 295 LDP parliamentarians and about 1 million dues-paying members. It only reflected one percent of the Japanese public.

Takaichi is expected to replace Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba since the LDP remains the largest party in parliament. However, after major electoral setbacks, the LDP-led coalition no longer holds majorities in either chamber and will require cooperation from opposition lawmakers to govern effectively.

The party will likely look to expand its current coalition with the moderate centrist Komeito with at least one of the key opposition parties, which are more centrist.

‘Must regain trust’

If elected prime minister, Takaichi will face a host of complex issues, including an ageing population, geopolitical upheaval, a faltering economy and growing unease about immigration.

First, however, she will have to ensure that the LDP, which has governed almost nonstop since 1955, can rally voters again. “The LDP must regain trust, and an overhaul is needed for us to start afresh,” Koizumi had said in the campaign, calling the state of the party a “crisis”.

One party on the up is Sanseito, which echoes other populist movements in calling immigration a “silent invasion” and blames newcomers for a host of ills.

Takaichi and Koizumi in the LDP campaign sought to appeal to voters attracted by Sanseito’s messaging about foreigners, whether migrants or the throngs of tourists.

Japan should “reconsider policies that allow in people with completely different cultures and backgrounds”, said Takaichi.

For his part, Koizumi said : “Illegal employment of foreigners and the worsening of public safety are leading to anxiety among local residents.”

Such alarmism from mainstream politicians is rare in Japan, where people born abroad make up just 3 percent of the population.

On the economy, Takaichi has in the past backed aggressive monetary easing and big fiscal spending, echoing her mentor, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

But she tempered her stance on the campaign trail, and the regular visitor to the Yasukuni war shrine has also sounded more moderate on China.

‘No interest in women’s rights’

Coming from the traditionalist wing of the LDP, celebrations that a woman is finally leading Japan may soon turn to disappointment.

Takaichi “has no interest in women’s rights or gender equality policies,” Yuki Tsuji, a professor specialising in politics and gender at Tokai University, told the AFP news agency.

Experts had worried that for all his charisma and modern image – he took paternity leave and surfs – Koizumi lacks depth and could have become a liability with voters.

Koizumi is “good at displaying how reform-minded he is, but he’s not very good at debate, so I wonder how long his popularity will be maintained after parliament opens,” Sadafumi Kawato, professor emeritus of the University of Tokyo, told AFP.

Whoever is elected within the LDP will soon face a diplomatic test: a possible summit in late October with United States President Donald Trump, who could demand that Japan increase its defence spending. Trump will travel to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in South Korea starting October 31.

It has been a long-running issue for the village, west of Regina, where residents say they have been tormented for two years by the Kingdom of Canada cult, with residents reportedly harassed, yelled at and videotaped by members of the group.

When Ricky Manz, the building’s owner and cult member, stopped paying the building’s utility bills last year, the village shut off its water and sewer. The result was waste overflowing from toilets and seeping outside the building’s entrance. Later on, members were seen dumping sewage on the property.

“The sewage smell was just horrific and really traumatizing the community beyond what they have already faced after having a cult occupy their community.”

NDP MLA Brittney Senger says a provincial health order for the building’s owner to clean up the mess in the village of Richmound isn’t enough.

“We’re calling on the government to actually provide support and clean up the sewage, so that the community can move past this trauma and so kids and families can finally go out and enjoy parks and playgrounds again,” Senger said in an interview.

But it wasn’t the sewage that led RCMP to raid the building on Sept. 3. Mounties said they obtained a search warrant on a report that someone inside had a firearm. They seized 13 imitation semi-automatic handguns, along with ammunition and electronic devices. Manz, cult leader Romana Didulo and others were arrested.

The (provincial) health authority declined to answer questions about why it didn’t inspect the building before the raid, as sewage began overflowing months earlier. It also didn’t say what the deadline is to fix the mess and when a health officer is next surveying the building to ensure work is complete. “The SHA is not responsible for scheduling or conducting this work. Only the owner can provide you with the timeline you seek,” a spokesperson said in an email.

Brad Miller, Richmound’s 64-year-old mayor, said the village of 200 people has been spending money to get rid of the cult since 2023, when it first arrived, but nuisance complaints and commercial building bylaws didn’t work. And the village can’t afford the cleanup now.

here’s a situation where a local municipality has a violent cult dumping human shit into a playground for months and the conservative government of the province does nothing but mealy mouthed orders, the federal colonial police care more about fake guns than children playing in shit in the town’s only playground, and private property is so sacrosanct in the legal system that the best the system can do is write a strongly worded letter telling the owner to fix the issue, with no deadline. total lack of state capacity and state willpower to do anything about nitwit fascists either proactively or even reactively. this is a good example of how canada tolerates fascism and right wing violence when even a fraction of the same behavior from some kind of indigenous land defender/antifa/pro-palestine group would see mountie snipers posted up around the clock

The European Commission’s drone wall idea is showing cracks before intercepting its first Russian intruder. With Russian drones crossing into Poland and Romania and unidentified (but suspected Russian) ones being tracked over Denmark, Norway and Germany, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is pitching a shiny new shield of radars and interceptors to help defend the bloc’s eastern flank. She called it a “drone wall” in her State of the Union address last month. Both the name and the concept are drawing flak. For the Baltics and Poland it sounds like a sensible response to a growing emergency. But countries further from Russia are poking holes in the idea, worrying about its feasibility and cost, how it fits into EU and NATO military plans, and whether it’s a power grab by Brussels over national defense policy.

“Drones and anti-drones are the priority,” French President Emmanuel Macron told reporters on Thursday. “But we have to be clear: There is no perfect wall for Europe, we’re speaking about a 3,000-kilometer border, do you think it’s totally feasible? The answer is ‘no.’” Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, a former Lithuanian prime minister, sprang to its defense. He said the original plan for countering drones covering Poland and the Baltics would cost about €1 billion, and getting detection capabilities in place could be done in less than a year.

yeah dude, sure, European military industry has totally shown itself to be capable of undertaking massive projects in quick timeframes

However, he conceded that calling it a “wall” might give the wrong idea. It “wouldn’t be a new Maginot Line," he said, referring to the French defensive fortifications that Germany successfully bypassed in World War II. There are also worries that the Commission may be over-promising. “I hope no one sees the drone wall as an easy fix to our defense problems,” said Hannah Neumann, a German Greens MEP and a member of the European Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee. “A drone wall won’t protect us from cyberattacks, nor will it help with air defense, ammunition production, or the deeper issues around decision-making structures and rules of engagement.”

EU money to fight drones

The divergences are especially problematic because Brussels together with frontline states want to use EU money to help fund the drone wall; for that to happen, all EU capitals have to agree. The reluctance of Southern countries — Italy’s Giorgia Meloni and Greece’s Kyriakos Mitsotakis both said during this week’s Copenhagen meeting of EU leaders that European defense projects should benefit the whole bloc, not only its Eastern flank — prompted calls for “solidarity” from exposed nations. “We have shown solidarity for the last two decades, for example, in Covid, in economy, in migration. Now is the time to show solidarity in security,” Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo told POLITICO. That disagreement was on full display in Copenhagen, both publicly and behind closed doors. Inside the room, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz slammed the plan in what one diplomat familiar with the discussion described as “very harsh” terms.

Defending against Russia

Despite quibbling over the size — as well as the name — of the drone wall, there is little debate that Europe needs to improve its ability to fend off Russian drones. The bloc lacks detection tech to easily pick up UAVs, and when NATO jets downed three Russian drones over Poland last month, they used multi-million-dollar missiles to knock down Russian Gerberas costing about $10,000 each. Although there were objections in Copenhagen, in the end EU leaders accepted the Commission’s defense proposals, including the drone wall — which means it’s expected to go ahead in some form. However, details on timing, cost and capabilities still need to be spelled out. And the branding is likely to change. On Wednesday, Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen talked about a “European network of anti-drone measures.” When she was asked by a journalist why she hadn’t used the term “drone wall,” she replied: “I don’t really care about the name as long as it works.” Beefing up anti-drone efforts makes sense at a time when Russia is probing NATO defenses. However, the measures aren’t a panacea — especially if the confrontation with Moscow gets closer to full-out war.

“A drone wall can work regionally — in the Baltics you can build a static defense,” said Christian Mölling, defense analyst and program director at the Bertelsmann Foundation. “But drones are only the fingers; if you want to win, you must target the head: command, logistics and production capacity.” Frontline states have no illusions that a drone wall alone will suffice to prevent a Russian attack. But they argue something has to be done to deter Moscow. “Of course, we are realists … we do not expect, for example, a drone wall on our border that will eliminate any threats 100 percent,” said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. “If someone is looking for 100 percent guarantees of security, they will find nothing. We, as NATO, as Europe, must look for methods that maximize our security.”

man who keeps poking the increasingly angry dog next to him: “SOMETHING HAS TO BE DONE DO DETER THIS DOG!”

Obtaining approval to cross neighboring countries by military convoy today takes much longer than a European Union target of five days – “more like tens of days,” said Brig. Gen. Fabrice Feola, who commands France’s Centre for Operations and Transport Support, in a briefing here on Thursday. The EU has vowed to address the bloc’s remaining barriers to military mobility in a regulatory proposal this year. The objective for military border-crossing procedures to take no more than five working days by the end of 2023 had “progress issues,” the European Court of Auditors wrote in a February report, with not all member countries meeting the target, and progress variable. A conflict on NATO’s eastern front could “mobilize resources on a scale not seen in years,” Feola said. “Efforts have to be optimized to ensure continuity in projection, should we face a major engagement in the east, and in reception, particularly in our role as a host nation for allies on the Atlantic coast.”

Europe’s overground transportation network needs to mapped out better “on order to return to what we had during the Cold War,” with no doubts or ambiguity about the capability of roads and railways to handle large flows, according to the general. A major mobilization would create competition on the ground transport network, including from the United States, “who in the event of NATO plans being activated, would land on a massive scale on the Atlantic coast and would need to cross our country to reach positions further east,” Feola said. “This notion of competition inevitably leads us to coordinate at the international level in order to make the best possible use of the resources,” he added. The amount of military equipment freighted across Europe jumped after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, with NATO countries moving troops east, stepping up exercises and sending billions of euros worth of military equipment to Ukraine. That has put new emphasis on rail as the most cost-effective and speedy means of land transport to move kit such as tanks and ammunition over long distances.

France organized around 150 international military trains in 2024, according to Feola, compared with fewer than five such trains a year before Russia invaded Ukraine. The rail transports support a French battalion deployed in Romania, and include trains heading to Poland with equipment for Ukraine at an “extremely regular interval.” The lessons learned from France’s deployment to Romania have been “extremely valuable” for the Center for Operations and Transport Support, with force projection “on a scale rarely achieved in recent years,” Feola said. France is one of the few European countries to own a fleet of military rail wagons, together with Germany and the Netherlands. “Railways are an absolutely essential mode of transport, especially in a context where our center of gravity for operations has shifted from Africa to Europe, and particularly Eastern Europe,” Feola said. One issue taking a lot of time today is checking route feasibility, for example whether a tunnel can accommodate a train carrying military equipment, Feola said. For a new set of EU military mobility rules to be unveiled this year, France is pushing to identify corridors capable of handling military vehicles and convoys, with sufficiently large and sturdy tunnels, bridges and roads.

“The solution, and this is what we are currently working on, is to set up these corridors, these train paths, to avoid excessive processing times,” Feola said. Germany, the Netherlands and Poland signed a declaration of intent in 2024 to set up just such a corridor, with plans to tackle infrastructure choke points such as low bridges and reduce bureaucracy for cross-border transport of ammunition and other dangerous goods. The EU is looking at simplifying procedures across the bloc, Feola said. “Speeding up the time it takes to obtain authorization to cross territories, digitizing a number of customs documents, all of these are achievable, within reach, and the current situation further highlights the importance and necessity of resolving them in the short term,” Feola said. While France has permanent border-crossing agreements with other European countries for a certain number of standard military convoys, those come with constraints such as the number of vehicles and whether there are weapons on board. French logistics officials are also calling for a coordinating authority for military mobility governance in Europe that can “ensure that everything fits together from one country to another, from one corridor to another, and that there is no discontinuity between corridors and routes,” Feola said.

Months of devastating Russian air attacks suggest Moscow has succeeded in altering its missiles to evade Ukraine’s air defences, according to Ukrainian and western officials. Bombardments that targeted Ukrainian drone makers this summer were a prominent example of Russia improving its ballistic missiles to better defeat US Patriot batteries, current and former Ukrainian and western officials told the Financial Times. Russia was likely to have modified its Iskander-M mobile system, which launches missiles with an estimated range of up to 500km, as well as Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, which can fly up to 480km, they added. The missiles now follow a typical trajectory before diverting and plunging into a steep terminal dive or executing manoeuvres that “confuse and avoid” Patriot interceptors.

It is a “game-changer for Russia”, said one former Ukrainian official. With Kyiv also contending with slower deliveries of air defence interceptors from the US, the missile campaign has destroyed key military facilities and critical infrastructure ahead of winter. Ukraine’s ballistic missile interception rate improved over the summer, reaching 37 per cent in August, but it plummeted to 6 per cent in September, despite fewer launches, according to public Ukrainian air force data compiled by the London-based Centre for Information Resilience and analysed by the Financial Times.

Yeah, I highly doubt the rate was ever 37% this year. “according to public Ukrainian air force data” sure dude, the famously reliable and truthful official Ukrainian government information!

Ukraine’s air force on Wednesday reported all four Iskander-M missiles fired overnight had eluded the country’s defences and hit their targets. At least four drone-making plants in and around Kyiv were badly damaged by missiles this summer, said current and former Ukrainian officials. This included a strike on August 28 on a facility producing Turkish Bayraktar drones, according to public posts by local officials. Two missiles launched in that attack appeared to have targeted the offices of a company designing and producing components for drone systems, said two officials briefed on the incident. The Russian projectiles eluded Ukrainian air defences and also damaged the offices of the EU delegation and British Council, which were located nearby.

The Patriot interceptors are the only ones in Kyiv’s arsenal capable of shooting down Russian ballistic missiles. Moscow’s cruise missiles can be taken down with less sophisticated air defences, but the updates have made it harder to do so, according to the officials. A western official briefed on Patriot performance data said the first indication of an upgrade to the Russian missiles was a marked drop in interception rates. They said a “pattern” had emerged in which incoming missiles behaved differently in their “terminal phase”, veering from their previously established engagement settings. The official’s assessment is supported by a report compiled by the US Defense Intelligence Agency’s special inspector general that covers the period of April 1 to June 30. The report said Ukraine’s armed forces had “struggled to consistently use Patriot air defence systems to protect against Moscow’s ballistic missiles because of recent Russian tactical improvements, including enhancements that enable their missiles to change trajectory and perform manoeuvres rather than flying in a traditional ballistic trajectory”. It cited a Russian attack on June 28 that included seven ballistic missiles, of which Ukraine shot down only one, and a barrage on July 9 — at the time the largest air assault since the start of the war — that included 13 missiles, of which the Kyiv downed or suppressed 7.

Ukraine shared Patriot engagement data with the Pentagon and the air defence system’s US manufacturers, said the western and Ukrainian officials. Virginia-based Raytheon makes the Patriot system, while Maryland-based Lockheed Martin produces the system’s interceptor missiles. The data is used to make updates needed to keep pace with Russia’s adjustments, but one official said those improvements often lagged behind Moscow’s evolving tactics. Sergiy Kyslytsya, Ukraine’s first deputy foreign minister, told the FT “the Russians continue to significantly upgrade their Iskander and other missiles’ technology”. He stressed the need for Kyiv’s partners to choke off flows of western-made components to Russia, including via China. Ukraine’s defence ministry and air force did not respond to requests for comment. Analysts said software adjustments were likely to be the reason behind the Russian missiles’ increased effectiveness. Fabian Hoffmann, a missile researcher at the University of Oslo, said manufacturers routinely mined interception data to improve performance. Russia, he said, appeared to be doing this. The Iskander-M “can manoeuvre quite aggressively in the terminal stage”, he noted. Rather than costly hardware changes, tweaks to guidance systems could instruct a missile to execute a quick manoeuvre just before hitting the target and then dive steeply, complicating the Patriot’s tracking and engagement ability. “A steeper terminal trajectory, that’s something you can programme in the missile,” Hoffman said.

Ukraine and Russia were “playing an adaptability game” when it came to their weapons technology, he said. But there was also a cat-and-mouse game being played in trying to destroy each other’s weapons systems. Kinzhal missiles are launched from Moscow’s strategic bombers or fighter jets out of reach of Ukraine’s air defences. Russia’s mobile Iskander missile launchers were also difficult for Kyiv to take out, Hoffmann said. Ukraine’s Patriot air defence systems, which consist of a radar, control station and launchers that are transported on trucks or trailers, are also mobile. Some of them have been targeted and damaged after months of sustained Russian attacks, meaning the country’s layered air-defence architecture has thinned. Specialist personnel trained on the Patriot systems are also a target, among them Lieutenant Colonel Denys Sakun, chief engineer of an anti-aircraft missile unit in Kyiv’s 96th Brigade. He had helped set up systems credited with what Kyiv said was the world’s first downing of a Russian Kh-47M Kinzhal missile. Sakun was killed in December while attempting to save Patriot equipment during a fire after a Russian strike in the Kyiv region, according to public accounts. Patriots were previously protected by other systems such as Europe’s Iris-T and medium-range batteries. Now, with some of those assets damaged or redeployed, “the Patriots have to cover themselves” while engaging incoming Russian missile threats in some cases, said one person familiar with the matter.

Ukraine does not disclose information about the number of Patriot batteries it has and where they are deployed, but at least six are known to have been delivered, with components of at least an additional three delivered in recent weeks by Germany and Norway. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has pleaded with Ukraine’s western partners to provide his country with more, offering to purchase up to 10 complete systems. With winter approaching, Zelenskyy has warned Moscow is reverting to its familiar strategy of striking Ukraine’s power grid to plunge the country into darkness and sap morale. But Russia’s evolving missile technology makes this year’s threat more acute. “Unfortunately, this has already become a traditional Russian tactic,” he said. “Russia is once again trying to hit Ukraine with a blackout this year.”

This month, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released findings on the Air Force’s troubled transition from the aging, silo-based Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to its far more advanced Sentinel replacement. We believe that the GAO report makes it evident that relying entirely on the current plan for silo-based ICBMs could pose grave risks that leave a future president with a far too-small ICBM force when the adversaries’ combined ICBMs have swelled. The ICBM leg of the nuclear tried underwrites America’s global military posture. It is the central deterrent, which allows Washington to project conventional power abroad without suffering a crippling nuclear attack at home. But the US ICBM force is decades past its programmed lifespan, and the next-gen Sentinel system continues to shock elected officials with its soaring cost. Given that the Air Force now says Sentinel will “predominantly” need new silos after years of saying the existing infrastructure will work for the new missile, now is the time for US officials to take a serious look at a road-mobile version of the ICBM. At the core of Sentinel’s 81 percent cost overrun, on an initial estimate of $78 billion, are issues with its silos. The plan had been to simply reuse the Minuteman’s Cold War-era silos, with some upgrades, to forego having to build costly new ones. But the Air Force has since concluded that those aging launch platforms are in no condition to support Sentinel into the late 2070s. Brand new silos are needed — and thus the total program cost of Sentinel has soared.

By putting Sentinel on road-mobile launchers, pulled by heavy trucks in military convoys operating in the sparsely-populated quarters of the US, the next-generation ICBM could be deployed quicker — and cheaper — than waiting for new silos to be constructed. Road-mobile ICBMs could reduce the ballooning cost of new silos by creating a mixed force which includes mobile missile launchers and silo-based missiles. While a mobile option may have appeared too costly when Sentinel plans were set in 2014, the total cost is likely lower relative to the information we now have about the realistic cost of fixed silos. The economics of a next-generation ICBM have changed. Not only that, the rapid buildup of China’s nuclear force simply demands the United States move faster and adapt its plans. Mobile launchers, which would be garrisoned in peace time, and dispersed in crisis to controlled driving circuits in the Great Plains, have the advantage of further complicating an adversary’s calculations and frustrating their targeting by denying them a fixed target to attack, as is the case with silo-based missiles. This gives an advantage to the United States and strengthens its ability to deter attack.

Now, some have argued that the solution is not to pursue Sentinel, but to simply extend the life of the Minuteman silos and missiles once again. The GAO, for its part, indicated the Air Force could keep those missiles viable through 2050. This option, as attractive as it may seem on paper, has been explored repeatedly and is deeply unwise. The first Minuteman deployed in 1970, and plans initially called for their retirement in the 1980s. It is only through extraordinary skill that the Air Force has sustained the decades-old technology that keeps those missiles on alert in their silos, every hour of every day, deterring nuclear attacks on the US homeland. The GAO notes that extending Minuteman deployments would raise the possibility of attrition and age-related failure. This should come as no surprise. Former Strategic Command chief Adm. (Ret.) Charles Richard has stated that given its aging technology and basing infrastructure, Minuteman can’t be sustained indefinitely. The missiles’ casing and electronic subcomponents suffer wear and tear. And their concrete silo shelters and launch command centers show signs of decay, as some of these structures date back to the 1960s.

China is rapidly building up its nuclear weapons and Russia routinely engages in nuclear blackmail. Both are challenging the United States and threatening US treaty allies. For the ultimate guarantee of US survival against the possibility — however unlikely — of a nuclear strike against the homeland, the United States must maintain an ICBM force able to guarantee to any would-be attacker that it will be on the receiving end of catastrophic destruction. Fielding Sentinel is the only prudent path forward. Make no mistake, it will be costly. But the security of the United States cannot afford to go without one. The United States can adapt, go faster and cheaper, and ensure it has the most reliable and effective ICBM force. US officials can ensure that continued cost-overruns don’t lead to delays and a diminished ICBM force in the long run by empowering decision makers to cut through bureaucratic hurdles and by deploying Sentinel on road-mobile launchers.