A nuanced attempt by Sen. Linsey Graham (R-SC) to assert that the U.S. should never have been in the position to have to launch the Normandy invasion 80 years ago fell with a thud on Sunday morning after he told a CBS host that D-Day was a "failure."Discussing battling Russian President Vladimir Put...
I thought the modern view of Chamberlain had evolved. Chamberlain knew that the UK wasn’t prepared for war. If the UK had instead went head to head with the Axis powers in Europe the UK armed forces would have been quickly been overwhelmed. Instead, with the “appeasement” doctrine, it bought time for the UK to prepare to be on the front lines of war, as well as turn up the war machine of USA industry.
I didn’t think the old thought that Chamberlain didn’t think think Hitler was a threat was still the common idea.
Wait, what?
As far as I am aware, Chamberlain was central to the UK (and their allies at the time) following an appeasement policy instead of intervening in Czechoslovakia (which, crucially at the time, had arguably the most advanced defense industry in the world, which Nazi Germany co-opted to substantially augment their own defense industry), Austria, or Poland. Add that to the fact that his defense policy was much more along the lines of bluster and bravado, instead of actually trying to gear the UK up for an obviously imminent (so long as one didn’t subscribe to the “appeasement” point of view) major conflict. This materially negatively affected the BEF’s combat ability during the UK’s attempt to help the French push back the Germans (TL;DR Dunkirk), and overall, gave the Third Reich the breathing room they needed to significantly strengthen their military industry, and as a direct consequence, their military.
All that said, if you have some sources regarding the “modern reinterpretation” of Chamberlain’s policies and actions vis a vis WW2, I would be quite interested to check them out.
“Therefore, British military intervention on the continent might be necessary “at any time within the next, say, three to ªve years.” Under these circumstances, the report concluded, the British military was woe- fully underfunded and unprepared, which necessitated a signiªcant rearma- ment campaign. 43”
“The rearmament campaign would be a slow one, particularly given the eco- nomic constraints imposed by the world economic crisis and British war debts to the United States. Consequently, the government needed to buy time and became obsessed with “the importance of not giving Germany any excuse to re-arm without further parley.” 44 Thus was born the policy of accommodating German demands in the face of increasing German perªdy, in an attempt to slow the pace of German challenges.”
“Their idea was that if Hitler were to begin open, full-scale rearma- ment in violation of part 5 of the Versailles treaty, Britain would be powerless to oppose the fait accompli; therefore, they were better off acknowledging Ger- many’s covert rearmament and permitting it, in exchange for freely agreed- upon limits on German armed forces.”
“This hardly refects a belief that appeasement would bring lasting peace. Instead, the documents reveal a wide- spread pessimism and feeling of powerlessness to stop the German challenges until Britain fully rearmed. 53”
source
You can also read the notes from Chamberlain on his meeting with Hitler, as well as UK General Ismay to the British Cabinet.
"(b) So far as air power is concerned, Germany may be able to maintain her lead over the Franco-British Air Forces in air striking power. On the other hand, it is open to us, provided that we make the necessary effort, to catch her up, or at least greatly reduce her lead, in the matter of defence (both active and passive) against air attack. By so doing we shall have heavily insured ourselves against the greatest danger to which we are present exposed: indeed by substantially reducing Germany’s only chance of a rapid decision, we shall have provided a strong deterrent against her making the attempt.
© It follows, therefore, that, from the military point of view, time is in our favour, and that, if war with Germany has to come, it would be better to fight her in say 6-12 months’ time, than to accept the present challenge.
source
Fascinating.
While I agree that the UK had few options at the time - and none of them great - the fact remains that Germany was subject to largely the same economic constraints: global economic recession, and (more onerous even than the UK’s war debts) war reparations that further crippled their economy. It’s just that Hitler and the Nazi Party simply built their military industry and armed forces up anyways.
One of the approaches Chamberlain could have taken would have been to open talks with the US government to discuss extensions on their repayment schedule, due to the disturbingly escalating tensions in mainland Europe (and don’t forget that the Soviets were also a significant threat at the time, ultimately culminating with their invasions of Finland and Poland). All that said… there were significant fascistic elements in the US at the time, many of which pushed for outright alliance with Germany, so unfortunately, that may have ended up as a non-starter.
TL;DR: while I appreciate the data and context, I still don’t think I agree with the characterization that Chamberlain did all that was possible at the time. Though, to be fair, fascism itself was a new and novel political system at the time, and not many people outside of fascist political leaders themselves really fully understood the full implications of a fascist world power (Italy; Germany). Also to be fair, Stanley Baldwin (Chamberlain’s predecessor) and Ramsay MacDonald (Baldwin’s predecessor) absolutely set the stage for the difficulties that Chamberlain faced. And, to again be fair, almost every single world power at that point was kinda also preoccupied with the Great Depression.
Edit: all of which is creepily similar in a lot of ways to the situation the world finds itself in now.