• davel [he/him]@lemmy.ml
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    20 hours ago

    Germany invaded Poland, and in response, the USSR went into Poland to keep Germany from occupying all of Poland, which would have broken the agreement regarding “spheres of influence.” In fact, Germany did break that agreement, and the “parade” was about Germany withdrawing from its overreach into the USSR’s “sphere.”

    It marked the withdrawal of German troops to the demarcation line secretly agreed to in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, and the handover of the city and its fortress to the Soviet Red Army.

    Once Germany entered Poland, all of Poland would have been occupied by the Nazis if the USSR did nothing, and that would have put the German forces right on the USSR’s border.

    • Wrufieotnak@feddit.org
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      19 hours ago

      And why did generous general Stalin agree to that whole spheres of influence thing in the first place? If he wanted to protect poor Poland from the evil Germanz, surely telling the world about Hitler’s evil plans would have been even better? Or at least warning Poland.

      But hm, strange, nothing of the sort was done. One could get the impression generous general Stalin didn’t care for the plight of the common polish citizen that was just to be unleashed on them.

      • IttihadChe@lemmy.ml
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        11 hours ago

        He literally did try to warn about the fascist threat repeatedly and was constantly rebuked by the west due to anti-communism and “appeasement” politics.

        They also weren’t in a position to go on an offensive against Germany all alone if that’s what you’re gonna suggest next.

        Their only option was a deal along these lines to buy time for themselves to build up productive forces.

      •   On March 17 [1939] the British Government suddenly remembered the existence of the Soviet Union and inquired what its attitude would be toward the Hitler threat in Eastern Europe. Moscow replied promptly and proposed an immediate conference between Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., Poland, Rumania and Turkey to consider how to resist German aggression. This was exactly and obviously what was urgently needed. Nothing less than a drawing together of all the threatened states could be of any avail. Rumania was under intense pressure to turn over her economy to Germany and the quickest action was needed.
          However, the Chamberlain clique could not make the shift. Knowing that they wanted to solve the Nazi menace on the plains of Russia, they ascribed to Russia the very same design of which they were guilty, as devious men so often do. They had a “deep seated conviction,” shared also by the French Rightists, that Russia wished to destroy the capitalist system in Europe by provoking a war from which she would remain aloof.5 The entire diplomatic record of the past five years belied this self-justifying suspicion. It showed that Russia was desperately anxious to avoid war, but also that on every occasion, without exception, she had sought to avoid war for herself by combining with others to prevent aggression or nip it in the bud. It was Russia which had incessantly pleaded that “peace is indivisible,” warning that if war came all would be engulfed in it.
          All this had meant nothing to conservative men bent on making terms with fascism and preserving it. Now, therefore, Chamberlain hesitated a week until Rumania capitulated and on March 18 notified Russia that her conference proposal was “premature.” This was the same rebuff given to Russia when she had proposed a conference a year earlier, at the time of Hitler’s conquest of Austria. Again there was no hurry, but this time Chamberlain did propose a substitute plan whereby Britain, France, Russia and Poland would consult if any further acts of aggression were believed to be imminent, but even this proposal was abortive, since it was at once learned, says Chamberlain’s biographer, that “Poland would refuse contact with the Soviet, which alone was enough to prevent us from taking up the Russian proposal for a six-power conference.” Chamberlain did not blame the Polish Government. He confided to his diary, on March 26: “I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia,”6

        The Cold War And Its Origins, 1917–1960. Vol. I, 1917–1950 By Denna Frank Fleming, Chapter 5

      • davel [he/him]@lemmy.ml
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        19 hours ago

        If he wanted to protect poor Poland from the evil Germanz, surely telling the world about Hitler’s evil plans would have been even better? Or at least warning Poland.

        This assumes that 1) Poland was somehow unaware of what its neighbor was up to and 2) the USSR was aware and chose not to tell them. Those are some big assumptions.

        • Wrufieotnak@feddit.org
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          19 hours ago

          Wait, just to confirm: you really believe that signing a pact to partition Poland isn’t a sign that in fact Poland will be invaded?

          • davel [he/him]@lemmy.ml
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            18 hours ago

            That Germany was very likely going to invade Poland was hardly a secret. Why else would the USSR have two weeks before offered Britain & France to send in a million of its troops to kill the baby while it was still in the crib? And why did they wait until that offer was refused before signing a non-aggression pact with Germany, a week before Germany invaded?

            “Had the British, French and their European ally Poland, taken this offer seriously then together we could have put some 300 or more divisions into the field on two fronts against Germany - double the number Hitler had at the time,” said [Major General] Lev Sotskov, who joined the Soviet intelligence service in 1956. “This was a chance to save the world or at least stop the wolf in its tracks.”

            “It was clear that the Soviet Union stood alone and had to turn to Germany and sign a non-aggression pact to gain some time to prepare ourselves for the conflict that was clearly coming,” said Gen Sotskov.

            It was only two years later, following Hitler’s Blitzkreig attack on Russia in June 1941, that the alliance with the West which Stalin had sought finally came about - by which time France, Poland and much of the rest of Europe were already under German occupation.

            The USSR had known for years that Nazi Germany was going to eventually try to destroy it. The Anti-Comintern pact had been signed six years before. Destroying communism was one of Nazi Germany’s primary goals, which is why first they came for the Communists. The USSR agreed to the Pact in order to buy itself time to built up its military for the inevitable invasion attempt by Germany.

      • Kras Mazov@lemmygrad.ml
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        18 hours ago

        You really think no one knew what Nazi Germany was up to and that it should have been the USSR’s job to tell the world? lmao